US Army War College

USAWC Press
Articles & Editorials
12-1-2006

Iraqi Security Forces and Lessons from Korea
Sheila Miyoshi Jager Dr.
Oberlin College

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/articles_editorials

Recommended Citation
Jager, Sheila Miyoshi Dr., "Iraqi Security Forces and Lessons from Korea" (2006). Articles & Editorials. 258.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/articles_editorials/258

This Op Ed is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Editorials by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AND LESSONS FROM KOREA
by Dr. Sheila Miyoshi Jager
Strategic Studies Institute
The creation of a viable Iraqi security force has been the sine qua non of our success in Iraq
(and the withdrawal of our military). The key question is, is this still feasible? This is not the
first time we have undertaken such a task. Some succeeded (the Balkans and El Salvador), some
failed (Vietnam), and some are ongoing (Afghanistan). But it was in South Korea, after its
liberation at the end of World War II, where we first attempted to build a national security force
from the ground up. And the effort was successful. Indeed, we undertook this task twice in
South Korea, first before the Korean War; and, second, to rebuild the destroyed armed forces
during and after the Korean War. While the failure of the young South Korean army to stem the
tide of the North Korean attack on June 1950 had more to do with the failure of our policy to
build an adequate military force against a conventional attack, it also obscured the success of
the South Korean security forces in conducting counterinsurgency operations against the
widespread North Korean-supported leftist insurgency in the south. There is much to be
learned from our experience in Korea that should inform our current efforts in Iraq.
The key lesson of South Korea for Iraq is that by accident, fate, and design, the fractured
South Korean polity at liberation in 1945 became a homogeneous entity by 1950. The security
forces also had rid themselves of divisive elements, thus becoming a cohesive national force.
The deep and intense regional, ethnic, and sectarian fault lines in Iraq are the greatest obstacles
to creating a viable security force, as well as an Iraqi nation. Our current plans for creating the
Iraqi security forces do not seem to face this issue squarely. The consequences might be that
either we will have to stay in Iraq for the long term in order to prop up the security forces or,
after our departure, Iraq will inevitably fracture into three parts after a bloody civil conflict.
The American efforts to build a security force in South Korea began almost immediately
after the occupation began in September 1945 after liberation as a Japanese colony. There was
no “Korean Army,” but a large colonial police force existed, predominantly manned by
Koreans. As a measure of expediency, the colonial police force, minus the Japanese, was kept
largely intact by the U.S. military government. This created an explosive political situation,
because the colonial police was the primary and the most despised instrument for colonial
oppression and the Koreans who served in it were considered to be traitors and collaborators.
The legacy of that decision, among other American actions, continues to serve as fodder today
for the growing anti-Americanism in South Korea. A lesson from this experience may be that
the controversial decision to dismantle the Iraqi Army actually may have been the right one. A
society that had been repressed violently by the state, an experience that would have left a
searing memory connecting the institutional apparatus of that repression, its security forces,
with the regime may require those institutions to be broken down completely and rebuilt from
the ground up if we are to have a security force that can earn the trust and confidence of the
populace.
The founding of the Republic of Korea in August 1948 marked the end of the American
occupation and the withdrawal of occupation forces. The United States established a military
group to advise and train the newly established armed forces and the national police. Prior to
August 1948, we organized a constabulary force to augment the national police primarily to
conduct counterinsurgent operations against leftist guerrillas. The advisory group, known as

the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG), established a structure similar to what we have in
Iraq today, advisors down to battalion level and military schools.
By June 1950, on the eve of the North Korean invasion, the security forces were successful in
gaining the upper hand over the insurgency. While the records of their operations are
controversial, the insurgency largely was suppressed by June 1950.
But the road was rough, and the toughest challenge was the fractured polity that constituted
South Korean society. Politically, there was a broad split between the Right and the Left.
Political fault lines were exacerbated further by regional, religious (Christians versus the
Communists), and class divisions. The pattern of a fractured society as a nation is born is
worthy of comparison. The more important lesson is not that Korea contained so many lines of
division, but that those divisions soon were separated and aggregated into two different
geographical and political entities, North and South Korea, and, more importantly, the security
forces did not mirror that division. The police and the Army (the navy and the air force being
insignificantly small as it is in Iraq) were dominated by the Right. The most important factor for
this outcome was the north-south division that concentrated the Right in the south, including
the movement of millions from the north. Another critical factor was the purge of leftist
elements from the Army between 1948 and 1950. The purges were unsavory and possibly
involved KMAG, but it led to a more cohesive force. The failure of the South Korean army
against the North Korean attack had more to do with American policy on the kind of equipment
and training provided than its cohesion and will.
The lesson for Iraq is this. The creation of mixed security force units that reflect society can
only mean a Shia majority unit. Regionally based military and police units are now
predominantly single sect-dominant units. Such a force suggests serious potential lines of
fracture that can undermine national identity, loyalty, purpose, and will. The mutinous soldiers
in South Korea formed the core of the insurgency that, in fact, started a Korean civil war well
before June 1950. The sectarian Iraqi security forces are now forming the core elements of Iraq’s
civil war.
There is no easy solution for Iraq, but the lesson of South Korea suggests that unless we find
a way to mitigate the sectarian divisions, divisions that have far deeper ethnic, historical, and
cultural roots than those of South Korea in the late 1940s, our current plans will only delay the
inevitable civil war, another Yugoslavia in the making. In the end, only a divided Iraq may
prove to be stable.
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